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问题学是研究“作为问题的问题”即问题的性质、规律和结构的哲学分支。从问题学角度看，理解一种智能形态的关键在于阐明其解决问题的独特性质和执行任务的独特类型。换言之，正确看待人机关系要求我们厘清人类智能与人工智能在解决问题和执行任务上的结构性差异。借助“元问题/一阶问题”和“困难任务/复杂任务”的概念区分恰好有助于实现这个目标：人类智能旨在解决元问题，执行困难任务，因此它更加依赖“小而精”的数据；相应地，人工智能旨在解决一阶问题，执行复杂任务，因此更加依赖“大而杂”的数据。问题学视域下的人机关系仍然是一种取长补短、分工协作的认知协作关系，它要求我们遵循人类智能的能量节约原则和人工智能的物尽其用原则。
Abstract：Problematology is a branch of philosophy that studies of “problems as the subject”, i.e. the feature,laws and structure of problems. From the perspective of problematology, the key to understanding a form of intelligence lies in clarifying its unique feature in problem-solving and specific types of tasks it performs. Accordingly, a proper understanding of human-machine relationship requires us to elucidate the structural differences between human intelligence and artificial intelligence in problem-solving and task execution. Conceptual differences of “metaproblems/first-order problems” and “difficult tasks/complex tasks” are precisely instrumental in achieving the goal that human intelligence aims to solve meta-problems and perform difficult tasks, relying more on “small but precise”data, while artificial intelligence aims to solve first-order problems and perform complex tasks, depending more on“large but heterogenous” data. From the perspective of problematology, the human-machine relationship remains a cognitive collaborative relationship characterized by complementing each other's strengths and a division of labor,which requires us to follow the principles of conserving energy for human intelligence and making the best use of artificial intelligence.
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基本信息:
DOI：10.13660/j.cnki.42-1112/c.016711
中图分类号:B15;TP18
引用信息:
[1]陈常燊.论人类智能与人工智能的结构性差异——基于问题学视角[J].湖北社会科学,2026,No.471(03):5-12.DOI:10.13660/j.cnki.42-1112/c.016711.
基金信息:
国家社科基金重点项目“分析的西方哲学史研究”（19AZX013）;国家社科基金后期资助一般项目“维特根斯坦与寂静主义研究”（21FZXB042）
2026-03-17
2026-03-17